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August 30, 2013, Chicago, Illinois 
 
Abstract: 
 
As China decentralized in the 1980s, many provinces received the latitude to implement their 
own strategies and approaches to economic development. Not surprisingly, such strategies 
varied regionally as provinces with different levels of wealth and resources implemented 
different approaches to achieving economic development. Yet, some of these examples are quite 
puzzling, with provinces that share many similarities implementing markedly different 
strategies. Moreover, some provinces not only implemented different approaches to economic 
development, but adopted entirely different goals – interpreting the very definition of economic 
development differently. To explain these differences, China scholars have focused on different 
factors, including constraints and opportunities from the center, characteristics of the provinces 
themselves, and attributes of individual leaders (e.g., Li 1997, Huang 1996, Chung 2000, Zeng 
1991). While these explanations are able to explain some of the more straightforward cases, 
puzzling exceptions remain. Moreover, how the provinces interact with lower levels 
administrative units remains under researched.   
 
Focusing on Guizhou and Yunnan, two provinces with similar geographies, institutions and 
natural resource endowments, this paper updates previous research in asking why provincial 
leaders adopted markedly disparate economic strategies. Using data from fieldwork and 
secondary sources, it focuses on the three political factors listed above that are purported to 
explain differences in provincial policy. I argue that while the center constrains and encourages 
certain actions and approaches in the provinces, the experiences and background of individual 
provincial leaders further affects the choice of strategies implemented there. While emphasizing 
the importance of characteristics of local leaders and their relationship with the center, the 
paper questions the assumptions on which research focusing on elite characteristics has so far 
been based, and suggests alternative approaches. In addition, since Li Zhanshu was appointed 
as Guizhou’s CCP provincial secretary in 2010, the overall direction for that province’s policy 
changed markedly. This allows us to examine the degree to which new leaders with different 
commitments and ideas can fight against the forces of path dependency and inertia to stake out 
different directions. The paper also explores the shifting relationships between provincial level 
                                                
1 The research of Cathy Yang, Hong Kong Polytechnic University was instrumental to the updating of 
this research. For help with his previous research, the author thanks research assistants, Guo Xin, Zhong 
Ke, Sa’adia Baig, Stephanie Tan, Tang Xin, Zhang Xuefeng, Chan Ying Xian, Sarah Wong, Madhu 
Chaubey and others, whose dedication, perseverance and patience made completing this paper possible. 
Zhou Chuanyi’s contributions were extraordinarily helpful—this Guizhou native provided numerous 
insights and tireless labor. Kremlinologist Robert H. Donaldson and Sinologist T.C. Lam also made 
substantial suggestions. This paper is part of the fruits of the Asian Network for the Study of Local China 
(ANSLoC), organized by Chung Jae Ho. Any remaining errors are solely the author’s. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the generous support of the Office of Research, Singapore Management 
University, for support with the overall project 
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governments and the lower level, highlighting different patterns for each case. The results have 
implications for our understanding not only of decentralization, central– provincial relations 
and the origins of the economic policies of Chinese President Hu Jintao, Guizhou’s previous 
leader.   
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Part I. Introduction 
 
This paper describes the decline of a model. From the late 1980s until around 2008, 
Guizhou followed an economic model that I dub the ‘micro-oriented state.’2 This approach was 
distinct from traditional developmental approaches to economic management that focus on 
GDP. Instead, the micro-oriented state emphasizes poverty reduction by promoting economic 
opportunities that are targeted toward poor, rural residents. Guizhou’s leaders did this by 
deemphasizing large-scale, high-tech industrialization, highway construction and so forth. 
While they did to an extent promote all of these things, they primarily focused on small scale, 
low tech development – village-to-town roads, small scaling mining, migration promotion and 
village-based ‘nongjiale’ style tourism – the kind of activities which facilitate the direct economic 
participation of poor people. This emphasis was notable in part because it came at a time when 
China was emphasizing growth at almost all expense. Thus, in previous research I describe how 
Guizhou focused on tourism, migration, road construction and mining in a way that was quite 
different than Yunnan, its counterpart. As a result, Guizhou, during this period, saw rapid 
poverty reduction, even as the province’s GDP grew slowly relative to its counterparts in China. 
By contrast, while Yunnan’s economy grew rapidly, its poverty declined only modestly. Despite 
the wide variety of leaders that presided over the province, the micro-oriented state model 
showed impressive resilience. This was due in part to central support and a degree of path 
dependence. But to a remarkable degree, it was the particular characteristics of local leaders – 
their experience with poverty and their conclusions on how to deal with it – that maintained the 
province’s commitment to this approach.3 Since 2008, however, this policy has eroded, reverting 
to one more similar to Yunnan’s.  
 
This paper outlines these changes. Since many readers may be unfamiliar with the author’s 
previous research, this paper reviews my previous comparisons of Guizhou and Yunnan. 
Yunnan here is presented as a comparable, but contrasting, case. After first providing a 
background into both provinces, and the curious pattern of economic growth and poverty 
reduction seen for more than two decades, the paper reviews the argument explaining why the 
leaders of these respective provinces chose the policies that they did. Since many readers may 
not be familiar with my previous argument, many of the details remain. A more complete 
account can be found in the aforementioned Journal of Contemporary China article for a more 
complete account. (Readers who are more familiar with my argument can skip this section.) 
Third, this paper turns to the present period, focusing on 2008 to 2013 to describe and explain 
the dramatic policy changes occurring in Guizhou. This part of the paper is a work in progress. 
The initial review presented here will serve as the foundation for subsequent fieldwork. Finally, 
the paper concludes with some observations regarding theory and practice. The paper has 
implications for our understanding of central-local relations as well as provincial-level 
policymaking, especially the factors that seem to cause of influence it.  
 
                                                
2 John A. Donaldson, Small Works: Poverty and Economic Development in Southwestern China  (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2011). 
3 ———, "Why do Similar Areas Adopt Different Developmental Strategies? A Study of Two Puzzling 
Chinese Provinces," Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009). 
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Part II. Background – A Tale of Two Provinces4  
 
Guizhou, a remote province in southwestern China, has long been derided as being 
hopelessly poor. Moreover, it grew but slowly throughout most of the reform era relative to 
other provinces. Ironically, however, this province is among China’s leaders for rural poverty 
reduction, ranking third in that indicator from the early to the mid 1990s, according to World 
Bank data. Meanwhile, the economy of Guizhou’s neighbor, Yunnan, grew rapidly on the basis 
of tourism, trade and especially tobacco. Despite the fact that these industries were often based 
in the countryside, Yunnan’s rural poor did not benefit much from them, and rural poverty 
rates remained stagnant. In fact, despite Guizhou’s much lower economic growth rate, the 
province’s rural poverty rates dropped below Yunnan’s by the middle of the 1990s, according to 
World Bank data. Expressed in human terms and calculated based on China’s poverty line, the 
number of poor people in Guizhou declined from 6.2 million in 1991 to 3.8 million in 1996, a 
difference of 2.4 million people. By contrast, poverty in Yunnan claimed an additional 2.2 
million people over the same period, with the number of poor rising from 5.5 million in 1991 to 
7.7 million in 1996.5 While this number subsequently declined in both provinces, Yunnan’s 
poverty rate remained higher in subsequent periods, according to unpublished World Bank 
figures. 
 
This paradoxical divorce between economic growth and poverty reduction, which, Chinese 
and international data indicate, began in the early 1990s and continued until at least the early 
part of the 21st century, is caused by the different policy approaches that the two provinces 
adopted. Yunnan’s leaders grew the province’s economy by focusing resources in limited 
geographical areas, promoting overall development in central areas, tourism in the south and 
pockets of the northwest, tobacco in the southwest and coal mining in various areas. An 
extensive highway system supported the entire plan. However, in pursuing these development 
policies, provincial leaders excluded large poor regions, primarily in Yunnan’s southeast, 
northeast, and most of its west, and structured industries in ways that made participation by 
poor people difficult. In short, Yunnan can in some ways be considered a type of outward 
oriented developmental state.   
 
In contrast, adopting as a primary goal the reduction of rural poverty through improving 
rural livelihoods, Guizhou’s leaders focused on shifting rural labor (through out-of-province 
migration) and increasing opportunities for farmers to increase their incomes at home, in part 
by building modest roads linking villages to local markets and promoting local, small-scale 
industries, such as rural tourism and coal mining. The “micro-oriented” state in this way 
augmented opportunities for poor rural people by supporting activities that poor people can 
access, particularly those requiring little formal education and technical experience.6  
 
Why did the governments of similar provinces adopt such markedly dissimilar 
development strategies? This research project, conducted through interviews, fieldwork and 
secondary research, explores candidate factors that could explain this puzzle. Was it due to 
                                                
4 As mentioned above, much of this section reflects content in Donaldson “Why do Similar Areas Adopt 
Different Developmental Strategies?” 
5 World Bank, China: Overcoming Rural Poverty  (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001).  
6 For a more complete account of the character and causes of the disconnect between economic growth 
and poverty reduction in the two provinces, see Donaldson, Small Works.   
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initiatives from provincial elites, some centrally initiated experiment, some historical or 
geographic reason, or a combination of these? I argue that while the center constrains and 
encourages certain actions and approaches in the provinces, the experiences and background of 
individual provincial leaders further affects the choice of strategies implemented there. 
Moreover, once a particular course is set and receives central support, a form of path 
dependency can encourage the strategy to continue even after the original leaders have 
departed. However, in Guizhou’s case, a particularly strong party secretary determined to 
fundamentally alter Guizhou’s policy direction subsequently overturned the forces of path 
dependency. That party secretary was later promoted into a key position in Xi Jinping’s 
administration. 
 
While a number of comparative studies have been crucial for explaining why provincial 
policy varies to such an extent,7 most have focused on coastal China, or at times inland 
provinces, leaving a relative paucity of studies of reform-era western China. China’s 
impoverished Western provinces, with their country-sized populations consisting of a large 
proportion of rural poor, have largely been left behind during first years of reform. While a 
number of studies have focused on Yunnan’s post-1978 provincial development policies,8 and a 
small handful focused on Guizhou,9 no study of which I am aware has compared the adoption 
of the developmental and poverty reduction strategies of these two provinces during the reform 
era.  
 
My previous research attempted to close this gap by examining two comparable western 
provinces that have adopted differing approaches to development, with strikingly distinct 
results. Doing so casts additional light into the reactions of provincial governments to central 
reform policies in the important yet understudied region of western China. In explaining 
variation among decisions made by provincial and local governments in China, scholars point 
to three groups of factors. First, some scholars explain such differences by reference to the 
central government, arguing that central experimentation and constraint can explain variation 
                                                
7 See for instance, Victor Falkenheim, "The Cultural Revolution in Kwangsi, Yunnan and Fukien," Asian 
Survey 9, no. 8 (1969); David S. G. Goodman, Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: Sichuan 
and Guizhou, 1955-1965  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and 
Provinces: China 1978-1993: Power as Non-Zero-Sum  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Jae Ho Chung, 
Central Control and Local Discretion in China: Leadership and Implementation during Post-Mao Decollectivization  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Elizabeth J. Remick, Building Local States: China during the 
Republican and post-Mao Eras  (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
8 See for example Dorothy J. Solinger, "Minority Nationalities in China's Yunnan Province: Assimilation, 
Power and Policy in a Socialist State," World Politics 30, no. 1 (1977); Qiaolin Gan, Dajin Yao, and Zexiang 
Yang, "Yunnan Fuping Gongjian Xiang Tezheng yu Yinsu Fengxi (Analysis of the Factors and 
Characteristics of Yunnan's Poor Counties)," Yunnan Caimao Xueyuan Xuebao (Journal of Yunnan Finance & 
Economics University) 17, no. 5 (2001); Renlian Wang, "Yunnan Pinkun Diqu Luyou Kaifa Fupin de Tantao 
[A Discussion of Poverty Alleviation through Tourism in Yunnan's Poor Areas]," Journal of Chuxiong 
Teachers' College 16, no. 3 (2001); Ben Hillman, "Paradise under Construction: Minorities, Myths and 
Modernity in Northwest Yunnan," Asian Ethnicity 4, no. 2 (2003).  
9 For examples, see Jianjun Lv, "Nongye Fazhan Yu Guizhou Xianxiang [Agricultural Development and 
the Guizhou Phenomenon]," Guizhou Caijing Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and 
Economics], no. 4 (1995); Shijie Wang and Duanfa Zhang, Guizhou Fanpinkun Xitong Gongcheng [Guizhou's 
Anti-poverty System Project]  (Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe [Guizhou People's Press], 2003); 
Daniel B. Wright, The Promise of the Revolution  (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); 
Tim Oakes, "Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and State Power," China Quarterly 178(2004).  
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among provincial governments.10 Second, others argue that characteristics related to the 
provinces themselves – factors such as initial conditions, cultures and histories – explain the 
adoption of differing policy approaches. Finally, scholars contend that characteristics related to 
political leaders in these provinces are critical to understanding policy adoption and 
implementation.11 I argue here that Huang Yasheng’s commonly used approach to studying 
provincial politicians, while balancing explanatory power and time dedicated for gathering data, 
cannot explain the patterns found in these two provinces.12  
 
A. Central Factors 
 
While many scholars accurately describe China as decentralizing since its supreme leader 
Deng Xiaoping started reforms in 1978, the center maintains a decisive hold on power in many 
policy areas.13 China’s is not a federal system. China’s central leaders hope that decentralization 
and local innovation will increase the efficiency of development policy, yet they fear the lack of 
control that decentralization also brings. Thus, China’s leadership faces what Chung Jae Ho 
calls a “centralizing paradox” in which the center simultaneously confronts the seemingly 
incompatible goals of reaping the benefits of policy decentralization while simultaneously 
maintaining central control.14 In trying to manage this paradox, the center can mandate or 
encourage local experimentation, as well as impose centrally mandated constraints, both of 
which can explain variation in provincial policy.15 
 
First, while central leaders promulgated plans and strategies that applied either to China as 
a whole (such as the agricultural reform policies of 1978-1984) or to particular regions (such as 
opening coastal areas to foreign investment first, or the more recent plans to develop China’s 
western and northeastern regions), they have also initiated or encouraged provincial-level 
                                                
10 See for example Susan Shirk, "The Chinese Political System and the Political Strategy of Economic 
Reform," in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China, ed. David M. Lampton and 
Kenneth Lieberthal (University of California Press, 1992); Dorothy J. Solinger, "Despite Decentralization: 
Disadvantages, Dependence and Ongoing Central Power in the Inland: the Case of Wuhan," China 
Quarterly 145(1996); Li, Power as Non-Zero-Sum; Kai-Yuen Tsui and Youqiang Wang, "Between Separate 
Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China," China Quarterly 177(2004). 
11 Examples include Goodman, Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China; Avery Goldstein, 
"Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC," China Quarterly 139(1994); Shaun 
Gerard Breslin, China in the 1980s: Centre-Province Relations in a Reforming Socialist State  (St. Martin's Press, 
1996); Alan P.L. Liu, "Beijing and the Provinces: Different Constructions of National Development," Issues 
and Studies 32, no. 8 (1996); Peter T. Y. Cheung, Jae Ho Chung, and Zhimin Lin, eds., Provincial Strategies of 
Economic Reform in Post-Mao China: Leadership, Politics, and Implementation (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1998); Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China; Pierre Landry, "Controlling Decentralization: 
The Party and Local Elites in Post-Mao Jiangsu" (Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2000); Zhiyue Bo, 
Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility Since 1949  (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002). 
12 Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations 
during the Reform Era  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
13 Tsui and Wang, "Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu."  
14 Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China: 11. 
15 These two categories (experiment and constraint), while identifiably distinct in the literature, are quite 
related and can overlap. Central experimentation will constrain local policy making, for instance. In this 
case, experiments in Yunnan could be tied the province’s role for national security, which is identified as 
a constraint. 
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experimentation. Regarding the puzzle being examined here, perhaps the central government 
hoped to test different approaches to development and poverty reduction in the two provinces.  
 
While little formal experimentation occurred in the two provinces, evidence gleamed from 
public speeches suggests that central authorities directed crucial elements of their economic 
policy and sought to encourage provincial leaders to implement different strategies. In fact, 
central officials during visits to the province frequently offered advice to leaders of one 
province that contradicted that which they proffered to the other. For instance, in his January 
1984 and February 1986 visits to Guizhou, General Secretary Hu Yaobang suggested that 
Guizhou officials focus on building rural roadways that link villages with the nearest marketing 
towns.16 This is in direct contrast with the advice Transportation Minister Qian Yongchang 
offered Yunnan during his 1986 visit, in which he directed the province to build cross-
provincial, transnational highways in order to open up counties to development and to create 
channels for imports and exports.17 Ironically, that same minister, in a visit to Guizhou that 
same year, in addition to discussing more modest plans for Guizhou’s highway system, 
underscored Hu Yaobang’s advice (and the opposite of what Qian had just offered to Yunnan) 
concerning the need to construct roadway linking rural areas in order to open up mountain 
areas to provide access to additional resources and improve the province’s economy.18 Similarly, 
Zhu Rongji, vice premier at the time, during a 1993 visit to Guizhou, recommended that 
provincial leaders concentrate not on higher class paved roads, but focus instead on concrete 
roads of the kind that generally link township to county.19 The next year, during the 2nd 
Plenum of the 8th People’s Congress, discussing Guizhou, Zhu reemphasized this focus on 
concrete, not paved, roads. During this speech, although Zhu emphasized the use of roadway 
for Guizhou’s industrialization, he also specifically linked this policy to poverty reduction, and 
tellingly added that the country would “continue to recognize Guizhou as a priority in the 
country’s poverty reduction program.”20  
 
That the roadway plans of both provinces conformed closely to these suggestions might 
suggest central experimentation. Yunnan officials focused efforts on building an ambitious, 
advanced transportation system that focused on a set of six paved, high-quality highways 
radiating out from the central axis of Kunming to three major border crossings (with Myanmar, 
Laos and Vietnam) and three other provincial capitals (Nanning, Chengdu and Guiyang). The 
six spurs, consisting primarily of class 1 and 2 highways, together totaled nearly 3,500 
kilometers, according to official provincial statistics. Underscoring the province’s importance to 
the nation’s development, Yunnan (unlike Guizhou) was part of the centrally designated 
                                                
16 Interview A, May 2007. In addition, Hu also suggested that Guizhou officials focus on developing 
small-scale mines, of the type that employ poor rural residents. While Guizhou followed this strategy, 
Yunnan leaders focused on developing more automated medium-sized mines that require more 
experienced and educated workers, as well as more capital.  
17 Yunnan Nianjian Bianjibu, ed. Yunnan Yearbook (Yunnan Nianjian). Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1987. 
18 Guizhou Nianjian Bianjibu, ed. Guizhou Yearbook (Guizhou Nianjian). Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1988. 
19 Guizhou Yearbook, 1994, pp. 133-4. Concrete roads are much cheaper than paved roads, allowing them to 
be laid more extensively. In Guizhou, which in the mid-1990s ranked third in terms of density of country 
roads linking village to market, has reduced rural poverty in part by focusing on this kind of road. See 
John Donaldson, "The Political Economy of Local Poverty Reduction: Economic Growth, Poverty 
Reduction and the State in Two Chinese Provinces" (Ph.D. Dissertation, The George Washington 
University, 2005).  
20 Guizhou Yearbook, 1995. 
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highway system plan since at least 1985, and received significant central transportation funds as 
a result.21 This highway system promoted the province’s economy, but did remarkably little to 
reduce rural poverty. By contrast, while Guizhou did construct a modest system of cross-
province highways of less than 1400 kilometers, provincial officials focused primarily on 
constructing rural roadways. The provincial plan explicitly prioritized reducing the isolation of 
poor areas by linking them to markets and increasing their access to information, thus spurring 
rural poverty reduction.  
 
Even more striking was the contrasting advice that central officials provided to the two 
provinces regarding the development of their tourism industries. In May 1992, Vice Premier Wu 
Xueqian visited Yunnan and suggested that, after several years of experience, it was time for the 
province to enter “a new stage of development.” Yunnan should first concentrate on 
destinations that have already advanced and possessed “a certain degree of notoriety,” and 
attract additional foreign investment to make further strides in constructing tourism 
infrastructure.22 By August of that year, China’s State Council approved its first set of “vacation 
spots,” which also focused on a small number of Yunnan’s well-known scenic spots. Generally, 
experts consider rural-based tourism to be a boon to poverty reduction. However, since nearly 
all of the tourism areas that were subsequently developed are located in areas that the State 
Council had already classified as non-poor by 1986 and were structured such that poor people 
could not easily participate in the industry, the effect on poverty rates was minimal.23 
Simultaneous to Wu’s visit, Yunnan provincial authorities adopted a policy to reverse course in 
their development plans for the tourism industry. They had previously decided to spread 
tourism over a wide geographic area and develop numerous poor areas with tourism resources, 
and even had invested significant funds in preparing these sites. However, officials suddenly 
decided instead to concentrate investment only in the non-poor areas that had previously 
become popular with tourists – policies that conformed to the advice that Wu had given them. 24  
 
Moreover, when then Vice Premier Zhu Rongji visited Yunnan in October 1995, he 
reinforced Vice Premier Wu’s advice by suggesting that provincial officials concentrate on 
developing tourism in a small number of areas that were considered non-poor, especially 
Kunming, Xishuangbanna, Dali, Lijiang, and Ruili.25 Each of these tourist areas, Zhu advised, 
should invest in large-scale roads, restaurants and hotels. Ironically, in April 1996, just months 
after his aforementioned inspection tour to Yunnan, Zhu Rongji offered Guizhou officials 
advice that contrasted sharply with what he provided their Yunnan counterparts. Whereas for 
Yunnan, Zhu had suggested that provincial officials focus on increasing the scale of their 
tourism investments in the province, in Guizhou, Zhu suggested that provincial officials focus 
on small-scale development of the industry.26 
                                                
21 Yunnan Yearbook, 1986. 
22 Yunnan Yearbook, 1993. 
23 John A. Donaldson, "Tourism, Development and Poverty Reduction in Guizhou and Yunnan," China 
Quarterly 190(2007). 
24 Caroline Ashley, C. Boyd, and H. Goodwin, "Pro-Poor Tourism: Putting Poverty at the Heart of the 
Tourism Agenda," in Natural Resource Perspective (ODI) (London2000); United Nations World Tourism 
Organization, Tourism and Poverty Alleviation  (World Tourism Organization, 2002).  
25 Yunnan Yearbook, 1996. 
26 See Wright, The Promise of the Revolution, p. 139. For an analysis of the contrasting effects of the two 
provinces’ approach to tourism, see Donaldson, "Tourism, Development and Poverty Reduction in 
Guizhou and Yunnan." 
Donaldson - Shifting Strategies 
Page 9 
 
 
From this evidence, it would be easy to conclude that the center was directing provincial 
development policy. However, one issue gives us pause: the advice dispensed by central 
officials to each province in many cases came several years after the provinces had already 
begun implementing the strategies that central officials subsequently advocated. One year 
before Qian’s visit and several years before Zhu’s, Guizhou officials had already focused 
resources on construction of those types of roads that these central officials suggested only later. 
In fact, the plan for concentrating on rural roadways was promulgated in March 1986 under the 
leadership of Hu Jintao, then Guizhou province’s party secretary, and China’s former president 
and general secretary. Starting in the mid-1980s, a key element of the “Directives Concerning 
the Work of Strengthening Poor Areas” was the construction of roads of a particular type: town 
and village roads that would connect remote areas to the nearest market towns and quicken 
response times to natural disasters. Guizhou officials, through the central government’s Yigong 
Daizhen (Food-for-Work) program, hired poor rural workers, compensating them primarily 
with in-kind payments of grain, in order to build rural roads linking rural villages, towns and 
counties, ensuring that poor people benefited not only from the roads, but also from their 
construction.27 This strategy continued throughout the early to mid-1990s, when Guizhou 
reaffirmed the importance of rural road systems as a part of its poverty reduction policies.28 
Meanwhile, the tourism policies that Zhu Rongji suggested for Yunnan had likewise been 
implemented since at least 1992 – years before Zhu’s visit. Similarly, for Guizhou, Zhu 
suggested a strategy for structuring Guizhou’s tourist sites that provincial leaders had adopted 
three years earlier. The province attempted in 1992 to structure the tourism industry in a 
manner that would increase the participation of poor, rural residents. Adopting a slogan of “the 
tourism industry promotes openness to the outside; use tourism to promote poverty reduction,” 
Guizhou that year became China’s first province to explicitly link tourism with poverty 
reduction.29 Central experimentation remains a possible explanation, but a tenuous one. The 
timing of central advice reduces confidence in this factor’s ability to explain variation in 
provincial policy. Something else must be happening. 
 
In addition to experimenting in the provinces, China’s central government can provide 
different constraints and opportunities within which provincial governments must act. Scholars 
use several indicators of central constraints. For instance, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael 
Oksenberg argue that a number of crucial variables affect the extent to which Beijing tries to 
influence provincial policy, including the economic role of the particular province in the 
Chinese economy, its role in national security, and its ability to earn foreign exchange.30 For its 
part, Yunnan operated under tighter central constraints than did Guizhou, based on evidence 
related to transfers, subsidies and extraction of taxes.31 Compared to Guizhou, official statistics 
                                                
27 For more information regarding this program, see for example Ling Zhu and Zhongyi Jiang, "'Yigong-
Daizhen' in China: A New Experience with Labour-Intensive Public Works in Poor Areas," Development 
Policy Review 13, no. 4 (1995). 
28 Guizhou Yearbook, Various Years.  
29 Zhongguo Luyou Nianjian Bianjibu, ed. 1996. China Tourism Yearbook (Zhongguo Luyou Nianjian). 
Beijing: China Statistics Press, p. 186. 
30 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes  
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Some of the variables these authors cite, such as physical 
distance and strength in local areas, do not vary much within Yunnan and Guizhou.  
31 Higher levels of remittances from province to center also correlate with longer tenures, which is 
consistent with Yunnan’s experience. See Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders. 
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indicate that Yunnan transferred more finances to the center, received more transfers from the 
center, and on net benefited far more, especially after the implementation of the 1993 tax reform 
policies.32 Further, the central government was much more effective at collecting VAT taxes 
from Yunnan compared to Guizhou, at least between the mid-1990s and the end of the decade.33 
Each of these factors suggests that the central government constrained Yunnan more than 
Guizhou. Yunnan, a border province, has for centuries been more significant to Beijing’s 
security than the isolated hinterland province of Guizhou, despite the historical restiveness of 
Guizhou’s ethnic minorities.34 Moreover, being crucial for tobacco production and international 
trade, Yunnan has a more prominent economic role and contributes more to the national 
economy. According to informants knowledgeable about this era, central officials had much 
lower expectations of Guizhou compared to Yunnan, and also did not really understand 
Guizhou’s economic situation. For these reasons, Yunnan’s provincial leaders bore more 
pressure to adopt policies that conformed closely to central policy compared to the relatively 
less constrained Guizhou.35 
 
Accordingly, Yunnan’s strategies and plans were much more consistent with central 
policies and approaches. The 13th and especially the 14th Party Congresses (held in 1987 and 
1992, respectively) each laid out policies that emphasized growth and development, and sought 
to reward provincial leaders in part for their ability to grow the economy at a steady rate and 
promote productive industries.36 While China’s top leaders debated vigorously such crucial 
issues as the role of the state in development, the importance of limiting political reform, and 
the need to maintain an ideologically conservative stance, they largely agreed on the need for 
large-scale, rapid development that would grow the economy.37 Yunnan’s developmental 
strategy, which emphasized GDP growth, was overall much closer to the spirit of development 
as (in the words of Deng Xiaoping) the “absolute principle.”38 By contrast, despite initially 
facing equally severe poverty and working under the same central government, Guizhou’s 
government was relatively less constrained and, focused primarily on poverty reduction, 
implemented plans and strategies that mainly helped reduce poverty, did little to stimulate 
production and often came at the expense of the economic growth that central leaders 
                                                
32 See also Shaoguang Wang, "For National Unity: The Political Logic of Fiscal Transfer in China," (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2001). 
33 Eun Kyong Choi, "Building the Tax State in China: Center and Region in the Politics of Revenue 
Extraction, 1994-2003" (Princeton University, 2006). Choi’s data begin during the mid-1990s. 
34 Tim Oakes, Tourism and Modernity in China  (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). The historical 
significance of Yunnan for security was emphasized during China’s military conflicts with Vietnam 
(Interview A).  
35 Interview A, May 2007. 
36 Stanley Rosen, "China in 1987: The Year of the Thirteenth Party Congress," Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (1988); 
Tony Saich, "The Fourteenth Party Congress: A Programme for Authoritarian Rule," The China Quarterly 
132(1992).  
37 The debates at that time among central officials over the use of planning versus the use of markets are 
largely irrelevant for these two provinces, both of which relied on the power of the state to alter their 
economies. Neither Yunnan’s developmental approach nor Guizhou’s micro-oriented state relied 
primarily on market forces. Central conservatives would have little problem with Yunnan’s reliance on 
tobacco and state-owned cigarette companies to grow the economy. Tobacco today remains among the 
last agricultural product to be channeled through state monopolies. Other central concerns, such as an 
emphasis on political stability and population control, were carefully emphasized – though often 
unsuccessfully – by leaders of both provinces.  
38 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3. 
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emphasized and rewarded. Thus, this factor – central constraints – seems to be consistent with 
the evidence from the two provinces. 
 
B. Characteristics of Provinces 
 
In addition to experimentation and constraints from the center, characteristics of the 
province itself also affect the decision-making process. These characteristics include a) initial 
conditions (such as GDP or natural resource endowments); b) differing cultures or histories, and 
c) previous policy decisions and previously established institutions. 
 
Although the economies of Yunnan and Guizhou were remarkably different in later years, 
at the dawn of the reform era, the two provinces were fairly similar (Provincial Statistical 
Yearbooks, various years). For instance, while Yunnan’s GDP per capita in 1978 was much 
higher than Guizhou’s, for the first several years of reform (1979-1984), Guizhou grew at a faster 
rate than Yunnan (7.7 percent for Yunnan versus 8.6 percent for Guizhou). Moreover, the 
provinces’ economic structures that year were nearly the same, with both provinces’ economies 
heavily agrarian, with large primary sectors (42 percent for Guizhou versus 43 percent for 
Yunnan) and modest tertiary sectors (17 percent for Guizhou and 18 percent for Yunnan). 
Despite having a lower GDP in agriculture, the per capita net rural income of Guizhou in 1980 
exceeded that of Yunnan (RMB 147.7 for Yunnan versus RMB 161.5 for Guizhou). Finally, when 
China’s State Council classified all counties in China as poor or non-poor in 1986 (and amended 
the list in 1994), Yunnan had more poor counties than did Guizhou, although the two provinces 
had nearly the same number of poor counties in proportion to their populations and total 
number of counties.  
 
In addition, the two provinces share similar geographic, demographic and political factors. 
According to official statistics, Yunnan and Guizhou primarily consist of mountains and hills, 
with a small proportion of plains (6 percent for Yunnan and 7.5 percent for Guizhou), and tiny 
amounts of land per capita (.15 and .13 hectares per capita, respectively), making agriculture an 
arduous occupation. Both have proportionally similar sized forested and water surface areas 
and both receive plenty of rainfall, although Yunnan’s rainfall varies in different areas of the 
province to a greater extent. Both provinces are major sources of natural resources, including 
coal, as well as dozens of minerals. Although in 2000 Yunnan had a larger population (if 
Yunnan were a country, it would be the world’s 29th largest by population), Guizhou (which 
would rank 33rd) has a much higher population density (108 people per km2 for Yunnan, 
compared to 213 people per km2 for Guizhou). Finally, the government institutions of both are 
structured identically. 
 
Despite these similarities, the histories and cultures of the two provinces do vary. On the 
surface, the cultural aspects of the two provinces seem comparable – both have primarily rural 
populations, and about one-third of the populations of both are members of ethnic minority 
groups of various kinds. While the minorities residing in the two provinces are different, there 
is little evidence that the cultures of these two contrast in ways that would explain the puzzle. 
Nevertheless, scholars and officials that were interviewed noted a number of differences. 
Guizhou is a much more recently established province, established in 1413, compared to the 
millennia-long history of Yunnan. Guizhou is itself considered a migrant province, with armed 
conflict having pushed many ethnic groups into the remote reaches of Guizhou by war, while 
members of the Han majority settled in the Guizhou area after 1250 through government 
Donaldson - Shifting Strategies 
Page 12 
 
resettlement programs.39 Due to the patterns of migration and war, some minorities in Guizhou 
are not only relatively recent arrivals, but also live in relatively smaller groups. Some minority 
groups in Yunnan, by contrast, can measure their histories in millennial terms, and live in larger, 
more concentrated areas. Thus, compared to Guizhou, Yunnan minorities boast longer histories 
as well as larger and perhaps more cohesive groups. As a result, according to this the argument, 
Yunnan minorities are more tied to the land, especially compared to Guizhou’s, and are thus 
less willing to migrate.40 As this line of argument predicts, throughout much of the 1990s, 
Yunnan’s migration rate has been far lower than Guizhou’s, according to official statistics.  
 
The two provinces, however, vary most dramatically with regard to the amount of financial 
resources that are available to them. While both provinces boast significant tobacco production, 
Yunnan was able to develop the industry sufficiently to command large sums of financial 
resources. For instance, Yunnan’s total budget was nearly 50 percent greater than Guizhou’s in 
1978 (and later this gap increased such that Yunnan’s budget more than doubled Guizhou’s by 
1991), and the province ranked first in China for government revenue as a function of GDP 
between 1992 and 2000, according to official statistics. While the lack of resources restricts the 
range of options for provinces, as Linda Li notes about Guizhou specifically, this factor also can 
motivate provincial leaders to resist central policies and go their own path.41 Indeed, Guizhou’s 
lack of resources may have encouraged provincial leaders to pursue policies that were more 
appropriate for reducing poverty, rather than more costly policies aimed at scaling up industry 
and developing the economy. Thus, the provinces’ financial situations also contributed to policy 
variation in part by constraining the range of choices between more or less costly options.42 
 
C. Characteristics of Provincial Elites 
 
Most importantly in this case, the unique characteristics of top provincial leaders (typically 
the provincial party secretary and governor, the vice-secretaries and vice-governors) can also 
influence provincial policy, creating variation across provinces.43 These include: 
 
a) Career prospects’44 Officials who know that they have a better chance of promoting their 
careers will be especially compliant with central demands.  
b) Origin.45 Huang formulates a four-fold classification system involving: (1) concurrent 
centralists (provincial officials who simultaneously hold central positions); (2) centralists 
(officials who previously occupied central positions); (3) outsiders (officials transferred 
                                                
39 Oakes, Tourism and Modernity in China: 89. 
40 Interview A and Interview C, May 2007. 
41 Linda Chelan Li, "Provincial Discretion and National Power: Investment Policy in Guangdong and 
Shanghai, 1978-1993," China Quarterly 152(1997): 780. 
42 That said, these constraints over Guizhou’s policies were not decisive. Guizhou’s financial situation did 
not cause its leaders to choose the micro-oriented state. The leaders still could have tried to implement a 
growth-first policy – as so many other poor provinces had. In fact, in many ways, a decision to pursue 
GDP growth would be expected. To argue otherwise would be to succumb to functionalist thinking.  
43 Xiaowei Zeng, "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China," Asian Survey 31, no. 6 (1991); Huang, Inflation and 
Investment Controls in China; Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China; Bo, Chinese Provincial 
Leaders.  
44 Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China: 5. Thus this factor is directly related to a previous 
factor, that of central constraints. In fact, many factors overlap across categories.  
45 Zeng, "Provincial Elite in Post-Mao China." 
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from other provinces); and (4) localists (officials who spend their entire careers in the 
provinces where they are currently appointed).46  
c) Clientelistic relationships. 47 Some provincial leaders belong to specific factions, and tend 
to implement policies that their patrons desire. For instance, membership in the China 
Youth League and graduation from Tsinghua University are assumed to be signs of 
membership in Hu Jintao’s faction, while experience in Shanghai’s government is seen 
as evidence of belonging to Jiang Zemin’s clique.  
d) Individual characteristics.48 As Chung argues, “In the final analysis, [local variation in 
implementation] might all come down to the issue of leadership.”49  
 
As expected, an exploration of the characteristics of these four types of provincial elites of 
both provinces between 1983 and 2001 reveals a great deal of variation.50 For Guizhou, like most 
provinces, 1993 was a year of transition in which eight of Guizhou’s 12 leaders were replaced.51 
Before that year, between 1983 and 1993, Guizhou was led by a series of three provincial party 
secretaries who served between two and six years. Of these, the first, Zhu Houze (1983-85) was 
a local, having been raised in Zhijin, a poor county in Bijie Prefecture.52 Zhu had extensive 
experience in the cigarette industry, having served as the general manager of the Guiyang 
Cigarette Company. His tenure as party secretary ended with his promotion to Minister of the 
Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP. The two other provincial party 
secretaries were outsiders. Hu Jintao (1985-88) was transferred from the central government, 
where he had served as first secretary of China’s Youth League. After serving more than three 
years in the province, Hu was transferred to serve in the same capacity in Tibet before 
becoming a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo during the 14th Party Congress 
in 1992. Liu Zhengwei (1988 to 1993) transferred laterally from Henan province (he served as 
vice secretary in Guizhou for one year before becoming secretary). After his term ended (at age 
63, a couple of years before normal retirement age) he became deputy secretary of the CPC State 
Organs Work Committee, possibly a symbolic post he held just before retirement. These top 
leaders were supported by three vice-secretaries (not including Governor Wang Chaowen, who 
concurrently served as vice-secretary), all of whom were local, and two of whom were from one 
of Guizhou’s poorest rural counties. Each of these subsequently retired after their service as 
vice-secretary ended.  
 
Serving concurrently with these top party officials was Governor Wang Chaowen, a localist 
who had worked his way up from his birthplace, Huangping, a poor county in southeastern 
                                                
46 Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China; Choi, "Building the Tax State in China."; Yumin Sheng 
and Yasheng Huang, "Political Federalism and Inflation: Subnational Evidence from China," 
(Philadelphia PA: American Political Science Association, 2006). 
47 Cheng Li, China's Leaders: The New Generation  (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). 
48 Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes; Remick, Building 
Local States. 
49 Chung, Central Control and Local Discretion in China: 10. 
50 Unless otherwise cited, the information here is taken primarily from provincial yearbooks, 
bibliographic books such as Who’s Who: Current Leaders in China, and other similar sources of information 
about local elites. 
51 This was part of a wider sweep leadership to occur that year. Intended to renew and rejuvenate the 
leadership to occur that year, this sweep replaced 40 percent of all provincial leaders throughout China. 
See Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders. 
52 Zhu was reportedly the first local to serve as top leader in Guizhou since 1965.  
Donaldson - Shifting Strategies 
Page 14 
 
Guizhou. Wang served in this position for more than 10 years – among the longest tenures for a 
governor in the reform era – until his retirement. While seven of the nine vice-governors of 
Guizhou serving between 1983 and 1993 were born outside the province, all had strong ties to 
the province, with eight serving in Guizhou for more than a decade and the ninth having served 
for eight years. Five of these had been transferred to the province in the 1960s to promote Mao’s 
Third Front Program, and subsequently obtained extensive experience working in industries 
such as electronics, power, steel, metallurgy and mining. After leaving their positions, most of 
these retired, either outright, or by serving in the Guizhou People’s Congress or elsewhere (one 
became president of Guizhou University).53  
 
In 1993, this pattern changed remarkably when Guizhou was represented by a long-
standing CCP secretary, Liu Fangren (1993 to 2000), who had been transferred laterally from 
Jiangxi province. Probably Guizhou’s most despised top official from the reform era, Liu’s 
tenure ended in disgrace – he retired briefly before being jailed for life for corruption in 2003 
(along with former Vice Governor Liu Changgui) for crimes committed during his tenure in 
Guizhou. Three governors served under Liu. Two of these, Chen Shineng (1993-1996) and Wu 
Yixia (1996-1998), came directly from the central government and the third, Qian Yunlu (1998-
2000), served as acting governor before succeeding Liu Fangren as party secretary. Governor 
Chen Shineng, a centralist and a classmate of Hu Jintao’s, was assigned from, and subsequently 
returned to, leadership positions in the Ministry of Light Industry. Chen was succeeded by 
Governor Wu Yixia, a popular and proactive governor, whose experience as an engineer and in 
the Ministry of Agriculture informed the anti-poverty policies he designed for Guizhou. 
However, Wu died while in office in 1998, and many of these policies reportedly died with him. 
The third post-1993 governor, Qian Yunlu, who served briefly as acting governor before being 
promoted to party secretary, had been transferred from Hubei. While the top two officials in 
Guizhou post-1993 came from outside the province and had little experience in Guizhou, most 
of Guizhou’s vice-secretaries serving between 1993 and 2000 and most of the vice-governors 
were either from Guizhou, had studied there, had worked their way up from Guizhou’s local 
governments, or a combination of these. Thus for Guizhou during this period, the presence of 
locals serving underneath the top two seats is significant.  
 
Based on this evidence, Guizhou policy was heavily influenced by local elites whose 
concern for reducing poverty probably stemmed from being raised in poor areas. In Guizhou 
before 1993, provincial policy was influenced heavily by either leaders who had either risen 
through the ranks of local Guizhou politics, or who had strong ideas about economic policy. 
Among those of the former type include Governor Wang Chaowen and party secretary Zhu 
Houze, both of whom were localists with ties to the provincial Youth League, which put them 
in the orbit of the young rising political leader, Hu Jintao, who led that organization on the 
national level. Hailing from Taizhou City in Jiangsu Province on the northern banks of the 
Yangtze River, Hu Jintao grew up in a family that, while not poor, was also not wealthy.54 While 
in Gansu, Hu came to the attention of economist and Tsinghua University graduate Song Ping, 
                                                
53 Bo notes that it is fairly common for leaders to serve in their own provinces as vice-secretaries or vice-
governors, only to be transferred to other provinces if they are assigned to top provincial positions. See 
Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: 66. 
54 Many sources list Hu as being a native of Anhui province. While Hu’s ancestral home is in Anhui, he 
actually spent most of his pre-university days in Taizhou City. See for instance Ling Ma, Hu Jintao Xin 
Zhuan [A New Biography of Hu Jintao]  (Taibei: Taidian Dianye Gongsi [Taidian Electronics Company], 
2006).  
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then Gansu’s party secretary. Song Ping cared deeply about the poverty that was endemic 
throughout Gansu, and this concern apparently brought this issue to the fore of Hu’s concerns 
as well.55 Zhu and Hu, faced with limited resources and central level support, placed a high 
priority on reducing rural poverty. The third pre-1993 Party Secretary, Liu Zhengwei, was not 
considered to be particularly active. Given this, Governor Wang is considered to have been 
politically dominant, especially after Hu Jintao left this position in 1988.  
 
Moreover, Guizhou’s government adopted poverty reduction policies that did not 
primarily operate through development, the accepted practice, but via micro-oriented policies 
that reduced poverty but did not stimulate the overall economy very much. Hu’s biographers 
argue that while in Guizhou, the leader emphasized poverty reduction measures, even to the 
point of sacrificing rapid economic expansion.56 While in Guizhou, Hu sent provincial officials 
to poor counties to investigate the local economy and make suggestions, and was applauded for 
having personally visited during his tenure each of Guizhou’s 87 counties. Moreover, Hu 
implemented experiments in northwestern Guizhou’s Bijie Prefecture (which contained the 
hometown of the previous party secretary, Zhu Houze), then considered the poorest prefecture 
in China. The three-fold approach adopted for Bijie emphasized not heady GDP growth or 
economic development, but poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and family 
planning.57 While only modestly successful, these approaches echo Hu’s ideas subsequently 
encapsulated by Kexue Fazhan Guan, discussed below.  
 
Supporting these two party secretaries were the long-standing localist governor Wang 
Chaowen and a set of locally oriented vice-secretaries and vice-governors, many of whom 
hailed from or worked in Guizhou’s poorest areas and none of whom apparently had prospects 
for advancement (nearly all of them subsequently retired from their positions after reaching 
retirement age). The resulting strategy focused on promoting opportunities, especially 
supporting small-scale TVE coal mines, constructing modest roadway systems linking village to 
township to county, encouraging migration and, later, establishing a grassroots style of tourism. 
Provincial policymakers distributed and structured these elements to maximize benefits for 
poor people. In this way, these leaders laid the groundwork for Guizhou’s subsequent and 
remarkable reduction of rural poverty, achieved despite one of China’s slowest growth rates.  
 
Post-1993 by contrast, central officials assigned to Guizhou, as they did for most other 
provinces in the 1990s,58 a series of party secretaries and governors that they transferred from 
outside the province – either from the central government or from other provinces. At the same 
time, however, the vice-secretaries and vice-governors who served underneath these leaders 
were mainly locals who had either worked their way up from local government service or had 
lived in the province since the 1960s. Being in charge of important portfolios, these second-tier 
officials ensured the continuation of Guizhou’s micro-oriented policy approaches established 
before 1993. Meanwhile, Guizhou’s micro-oriented approach had achieved at least some central 
                                                
55 Siyong Wen and Zhichu Ren, Hu Jintao Zhuan [Biography of Hu Jintao]  (Carle Place, NY: Mirror Books, 
2002). 98-9. 
56 See for example ibid., 190. This conflicts with Li’s tentative conclusion that during his tenure in 
Guizhou, Hu Jintao “did not seem to make many changes,” Li, China's Leaders: 116.  
57 Youlang Zhao, ed. Kaifa Fupin, Shengtai Jianshe: Bijie Shiyanqu Shiwu Nian Huigu yu Zhanwang [Poverty 
Reduction, Environmental Conservation: A Review and Outlook on the 15 Years of the Bijie Experimental Zone] 
(Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe [Guizhou People's Publishing House], 2003). 
58 Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: 84-5. 
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support, as evidenced by the endorsements of central leaders (the most influential of these, then 
Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, made his support explicit in 1994). The combined support both above 
and below top provincial leaders helped keep intact the original strategies, despite the fact that 
top officials were outsiders, and other constraints, such as the corruption of Party Secretary Liu 
Fangren. The governors, appointed by the center, who served concurrently with Liu, moreover, 
had experience in areas (light industry and agriculture) that were relevant to the province’s 
micro-oriented approach. That Secretary Liu was succeeded by acting Governor Qian Yunlu, a 
politician with ties to the Youth League, and was supported by lower-level officials with ties to 
Tsinghua University or the Youth League, is further evidence of the attempt to continue policies 
that Hu Jintao as Guizhou’s provincial party secretary had years ago helped to set in place.  
 
Yunnan, by contrast, can be characterized as having top leaders with extraordinarily long 
tenures, leaders that survived the national 1993 wave of retirements of top provincial leaders.59 
In fact, the two top positions in Yunnan’s provincial politics during the decade between 1985 
and 1995 (and beyond) were especially stable, each being held by just one powerful local leader 
from a non-poor area of the province. The party secretary, Pu Chaozhu (1985-1995), was a 
localist who had risen from the ranks in the local government of his birthplace, Yuxi, Yunnan’s 
largest tobacco growing region, and one of the province’s wealthiest areas. Among the 95 
provincial party secretaries to serve in the reform era, Pu’s nearly decade-long tenure was fifth 
longest. Serving an even longer tenure (twelve years), Governor He Zhiqiang (1985-1998) 
ranked as China’s longest-serving provincial leader from the post-Mao era.60 Governor He was 
a member of the Naxi minority and a native of Lijiang, which subsequently became one of the 
province’s most popular and well-developed tourism sites. Both of these long-standing top 
leaders had reached the apex of their careers, and retired from politics after their long stints in 
Yunnan. The pair represented two of the four members of the self-named “Southern Yunnan 
clique” (Diannan Bang) of local leaders that stayed in power long past 1993, when, as mentioned 
earlier, 40 percent of provincial officials throughout China, including most of Guizhou’s 
leadership, retired.61 This group implemented policies that were consistent with the central 
emphasis on spurring development and GDP growth, primarily through rapidly increasing 
tobacco and cigarette production, promoting rural-based tourism, exploiting Yunnan’s mineral 
resources and constructing an extensive highway system. The factors that where crucial to 
Yunnan’s rapid development – tobacco, highways, mining and tourism – were all large in scale 
and primarily benefited the areas of Yunnan that were already non-poor. Not coincidentally, 
these policies also directly served the economic interests of the areas that the four members of 
the Diannan Bang called home.  
 
After these two leaders, Secretary Pu and Governor He, finally retired, Yunnan’s next two 
party secretaries served about three years each. Gao Yan (1995-1997) was transferred from his 
                                                
59 ———, "Economic Performance and Political Mobility: Chinese Provincial Leaders," Journal of 
Contemporary China 5, no. 12 (1996). According to Bo, officials who successfully grow their provinces’ 
economies are most likely to be retained (although not promoted). Bo also notes that central authorities 
tend to retain minority provincial leaders longer than others in part because they are “scarce resources.” 
This explains the lengthy tenures of Yunnan governor He Zhiqiang and Guizhou governor Wang 
Chaowen, but not the nearly decade long tenure of Yunnan’s secretary Pu Chaozhu, who is Han. 
60 The ranking data are compliments of Philip Hsu of National Taiwan University.  
61 The other two members of this group were Li Jiating, the disgraced former party secretary, also born in 
a tobacco growing region, and Yin Jun, the head of the Yunnan People’s Congress and a native of the 
non-poor tourist area of Dali. 
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post as governor of Jilin Province to become Yunnan’s party secretary just after Pu Chaozhu 
retired. After his service to Yunnan, Gao (the protégé of former Premier Li Peng) was promoted 
to become president (equivalent of minister) of Power Generation, but fled to Australia in 2002 
to escape punishment for corrupt activities.62 Linghu An (1997-2001), meanwhile, was assigned 
from his position as vice-minister of the Ministry of Labor. Linghu’s career prospects were 
reportedly dimmed by the arrest for corruption of Governor Li Jiating, who served concurrently 
to Linghu’s term in office, taking over after He Zhiqiang retired. For his part, Governor Li 
Jiating (1998-2001), a Tsinghua University graduate, was born in Shiping, a tobacco-producing 
county in Yuxi prefecture, but served for three decades in Heilongjiang province as vice 
governor and later vice-secretary of Harbin Municipality. Thus, just one of the party secretaries 
and governors who had served after Pu and He retired in the mid-to-late 1990s can be 
considered local, and that one, Li Jiating, while born in Yunnan, spent most of his life and career 
in a province in the opposite corner of China. While, as in Guizhou, many of the vice-governors 
serving under Pu and He over the course of the 1980s and the mid-1990s had extensive ties to 
Yunnan politics, only three of the subsequent eight vice-secretaries were local. This lack of 
localist ties in Yunnan also helps explain Yunnan top officials’ continuing compliance with 
central development strategies.  
 
Part III. Post 2005 pattern 
 
Subsequently, Guizhou’s long-standing approach to economic policy changed markedly. 
As mentioned above, the policy stability seen in the post-1993 period relied on lower level 
officials (such as vice secretaries and vice governors). By December 2005 however, Shi 
Zongyuan, a leader apparently from Hu Jintao’s faction, became provincial party secretary. 
Shi’s background not only overlapped with that of Hu, but his experience with poverty was 
every bit as profound. Born in 1946 (Shi was just four years younger than Hu) in Baoding, Hebei 
province, Shi spent most of his first nine years in Ya’an, Sichuan province. Because Shi’s parents 
could not afford to support their five children, Shi was sent to his uncle’s house in Gansu 
province, where he mostly remained until 1998 (except for a two year stint attending the party 
school in Beijing). Like Hu, Shi slowly developed his career in government in Gansu province. 
His service in in the provincial party school, in the agricultural and forestry bureau, working as 
a magistrate in the local court, and then as a leader in local government, would place Shi in 
direct contact with poor farmers in Gansu.63 During much of his tenure, Shi worked in Hezhang, 
a poor county outside of Lanzhou. Rich in natural resources, Shi gained experience in 
developing coal, tourism and agriculture, as well as spurring migration; each of these was a 
focus of the county government during Shi’s time there.64 During his time in Gansu, Shi 
overlapped with Hu Jintao in a number of places. His experience in both the local and central 
party school also put him in Hu’s orbit.  
 
                                                
62 Gao was under suspicion for corruption related to the Three Gorges Dam project. Oakes also notes that 
Gao was being investigated for suspect activities that occurred during his tenure in Yunnan. See Erik 
Eckholm, "Chinese Power Company Chief Flees the Country and Scrutiny,"  New York Times(2002), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E1D6113DF933A15753C1A9649C8B63&n=Top/R
eference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/E/Ethics; Oakes, "Building a Southern Dynamo: Guizhou and State 
Power," 481. 
63 Yong Xingzhong, “Remembering Shi Zongyuan.” Nanfang Zhoumo. April 2013. 
http://www.infzm.com/content/89569  
64 “Shi Zongyuan,” China Vitae. http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Shi_Zongyuan%7C280.   
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Shi Zongyuan was subsequently appointed as Guizhou’s provincial party secretary in 2005, 
serving in the same position that Hu had nearly thirty years earlier. Given his background, it is 
not surprising that Shi emphasized many of the same tenants of the micro-oriented state that 
Hu and his successors had. Shi was an enthusiastic supporter of Hu’s “Scientific Development 
View” approach to economic policy, supplementing GDP with other more meaningful 
indicators of economic performance. For instance, in a 2007 speech for the provincial party 
representative conference, Shi criticized the simple measure like GDP, and emphasized 
conservation of forested land and protecting water quality as central to Guizhou’s long-term 
development and competitiveness. He stressed that, for this reason, it was necessary to avoid 
“short-term behaviors” that waste money, such as creating “achievement projects”, and 
construct wasteful “image projects.”65 Shi also supported the ‘food for work’ policy that, as 
mentioned above, had for decades been a major part of Guizhou’s poverty reduction strategy.66 
Like Hu and his successors, Shi maintained preferential policies that promoted small TVE coal 
mines, an approach that helped to reduce rural poverty. While Shi focused on developing 
Guizhou’s highway system linking Guiyang with neighboring provincial capitals, he continued 
to emphasize the construction of roads that linked villages to nearby marketing towns. Even as 
he developed Guizhou’s major tourist spots, he continued the micro-oriented approach of 
assuring that poor local residents could participate in grassroots, rural-based tourism. To be 
sure, many of Shi’s policies were large in scale. Yet, as mentioned above, the micro-oriented 
state strategy does not depend on the complete exclusion of development-oriented activities. 
More important is that economic opportunities for poor people – in mining and tourism, though 
road construction and promoting migration – all continued. All of these policies, consistent with 
the micro-oriented approach, are linked to rural poverty reduction.67 
 
However, the Guizhou government under Shi’s administration was not unified. Secretary 
Shi Zongyuan, for much of his tenure, had to contend with Governor Lin Shusen, who had 
quite different ideas on economic policy. In contrast to the modest background of Secretary Shi, 
Governor Lin was born and raised in Guangzhou province. Appointed in June 2006, Lin 
transferred from his position as the Communist Party Secretary of Guangzhou Municipality, 
one of the wealthiest cities in China and the center of China’s manufacturing heartland. Lin, just 
six months younger than Shi, had spent his entire career in Guangzhou. Although becoming a 
provincial governor would formally be considered a promotion, it must have been seen as 
unusual to suddenly shift from the top spot of one of China’s wealthiest cities to become 
number two in one of China’s least developed provinces. Reportedly proud of his experiences 
and accomplishments in Guangzhou, Lin clashed with Shi in numerous arenas. For instance, 
one of Governor Lin’s pet projects was to tap Guizhou’s groundwater as a source of potable 
water. Governor Lin hoped to invest RMB 10 billion to provide a planned 1.6 million rural 
residents with drinking water. However, Shi’s experiences in Gansu province, where the same 
kind of tapping of groundwater caused the earth to sink in many areas, motivated him to 
oppose such policies vehemently and publicly.  The two clashed bitterly over the policy during 
much of their tenures together.68  
                                                
65 Shi Zongyuan,“Representative Shi Zongyuan: Protecting the environment is also a political 
achievement.” People’s Daily. March 2010. http://env.people.com.cn/GB/11078009.html  
66 Xinhuai Wang, "The 'Yigong Daizheng' Policy of Chinese Government" (paper presented at the The 
International Policy Workshop on Employment for Poverty Alleviation and Food Security, Airlie House, 
VA, October 11-14, 1993 1993); Donaldson, Small Works. 
67 ———, Small Works. 
68 http://www.gzdzhj.com/ViewThread.aspx?id=142&ThreadId=4c6097da-c146-4985-89bb-
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Already under such a strong-willed governor, evidence emerges that Guizhou’s policy 
began to deviate from its previous commitment to poverty reduction. For instance, whereas 
poverty and rural development were listed at the very top of the government work report of 
2006 and 2007, by 2008 – still in the middle of the Shi-Lin administration in Guizhou – the work 
report began to deemphasize direct poverty reduction. In fact, the word poverty mentioned 
only once between 2008 and 2013 in the work report, and was in places replaced by the term 
“people’s livelihood” – a much more general term, which could be closer to a basis of 
promoting GDP. Moreover, even people’s livelihood didn’t receive the pride of place received 
by the term ‘poverty’ in 2006 and 2007. Listed among the top priorities between 2008 and 2013 
were urbanization and industrialization (neither of which was listed before 2007), 
transportation infrastructure (seen as the basis of development, not poverty reduction), 
investment, agricultural restructuring and so forth. It seems clear that Lin’s experience and 
proclivities, brought from his tenure in Guangzhou Municipality, were being transported to 
Guizhou. This occurred, despite the commitment to a more broad-based development strategy 
of Shi Zongyuan, who formally held the top position. 
 
The political conflicts between these two top leaders continued throughout the rest of their 
tenure, and came to a head when both were compelled to resign simultaneously in August 2010. 
Shi was 64 at the time – near retirement age anyway. He spent the remaining years of his life 
serving as the vice-chairman of the Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee of the NPC.69 Shi 
Zongyuan passed away earlier this year (March 2013), aged just 67. For his part, Lin Shusen – 
age 63 at the time – was also transferred to a relatively insignificant post, serving as the vice-
Chairman of 11th CPPCC Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese Committee.  
 
Thus during this period then, even as the micro-oriented state was maintained as the 
primary economic strategy, under the influence of Lin, this strategy begins to be eroded. What 
was the result? Taking investment in fixed assets as an example, Guizhou’s investment grew 
more slowly than that of Yunnan’s in 2006, closely matches Yunnan’s in 2007 and 2008, and 
exceeds both Yunnan’s and China’s growth in investment between 2009-2011 (the last year 
statistics I had access to statistics). Moreover, Guizhou’s largest cities began to experience rapid 
growth during this period. The GDP of Guiyang, Guizhou’s capital, grew a total of 50 percent 
between 2005-2008; the GDP of northern Guizhou city of Zunyi grew nearly 45 percent; the 
prefecture city of Anshun grew 56 percent, and the mining center of Liupanshui grew 61 
percent. While these three cities were still dwarfed in economic size compared to to their 
counterparts in Yunnan – such as Kunming, Yuxi or Qujing – their growth rates matched them. 
Moreover, Guizhou’s GDP per capita for the first time grew faster than 20 percent starting in 
2007 and 2008. While the livelihood of Guizhou’s rural residents in both poor and non-poor 
counties – as reflected by net rural income – continued to grow rapidly, the growth of 
Guizhou’s economy also spread to its urban areas.  
 
The policy influence of Lin served as a transition to Shi’s successor, who was closer in spirit 
to Lin than Shi. Li Zhanshu, who served as party secretary of Guizhou province between 2010-
2012, represented a fundamental break with the policies of the past, embracing wholeheartedly 
                                                                                                                                                       
609696c0107d; http://www.gzdzhj.com/ViewThread.aspx?id=142&ThreadId=6368aceb-7761-4753-8809-
581d20586066; http://www.gz103.cn/?thread-7042-1.html 
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development policies that focused on large scale, high tech industrialization, agricultural 
commercialization, urbanization and attracting outside investment. Born in 1950 in Pingshan 
county, Hebei province, Li spent most of his life and career in central and northeastern 
provinces, serving in Hebei, Shaanxi and most prominently Heilongjiang. While he started his 
career in administration in county administration, in the mid 1980s, when Li was in his mid-
1930s and the reform era was still new, Li’s experience was exclusively confined to the large 
urban centers of Shijiazhuang, Chengde, Xi’an, and Harbin. He thus does not seem to have the 
intimate experience with poverty that his predecessors had. This career brought him into the 
orbit of Xi Jinping. Both Li and Xi were members of “red families,” marking them as 
princelings. To be sure, “Princeling” status does not necessarily imply political alliance. More 
significant was the fact that Li and Xi overlapped in the early 1980s, when Li served as party 
secretary of Wuji county, Hebei, and Xi (three years younger than Li) was his counterpart in 
Zhengding county, just 30 kilometers away. Li has also emphasized administration reform, 
much as Xi has done. Thus it was natural that after a scandal involving one of Hu Jintao’s 
closest aides, Ling Jihua, Li Zhanshu was promoted – tapped as Ling’s replacement as director 
of the general office, where he serves today. When Li left Guizhou for the general office in 2012, 
Li’s governor, Zhao Kezhi was promoted to general secretary.  
 
Before this promotion, however, Li oversaw a vigorous administration of Guizhou, based 
on the pursuit of GDP growth, industrialization and urbanization of Guizhou. Li’s deep 
commitment to GDP-lead growth and his break from the micro-oriented state became clear in a 
number of his speeches. In 2011, for instance, he remarked,  
 
The key to finding an appropriate path for agriculture and rural area is industrialization 
and urbanization… The achievements of the eleventh five-year plan have paved a solid 
foundation, and we are now moving on to an accelerated period of industrialization and 
urbanization. The new round of western development, the relocation of factories in east, 
and expansion of central government are advantageous opportunities for us.70 
 
Regarding his attitude of the strategy to adopt to further reduce poverty in Guizhou, Li 
argued “poverty alleviation without industrialization is like cooking without rice ().”  
 
In terms of industrialization, Li’s policies included a focus on energy, the processing of 
natural resources, the development of ‘specialized industries,’ and promotion of aerospace. By 
October 2010, just a few months after Li took office, he propagated his ideas in a Decision 
entitled “Concerning the Implementation of a Strong Industrialized Province.” That Li expected 
industrialization to link directly to poverty reduction is evidenced by his use of poverty 
alleviation funds. For instance, Li dedicated more than RMB 122 million from the poverty 
alleviation office alone to support the establishment of 15 rural-based industrial parks. The idea 
of attracting massive volumes of outside investment dated back to Li’s tenure as Party Secretary 
of Heilongjiang province, where, as early as 2006, he developed a number of policies designed 
to reach out to large-scale outside investors. Li deepened these ideas even further for Guizhou, 
assigning several officers the responsibility of attracting outside investment, and enshrining the 
strategy as part of government policy (in Heilongjiang, it the strategy was promoted in speeches, 
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but not enshrined in official policy).71 The strategy included several planks, including provision 
of land, facilitation of project formulation, liberal policies allowing local governments to transfer 
funds to large companies with more than RMB 100 million, and tax incentives. Attracting 
investment also became a key part of the performance criteria for the promotion and retention 
of local officials, with leaders on various levels receiving quotas for expected investment. For 
instance, leaders of the biggest prefecture-level cities were expected to attract RMB 1 billion 
each year, while leaders of 27 developed counties were expected to attract RMB 400 million.72 
The pro-investment policy bore fruit. Whereas utilized outside investment held steady between 
2005-2009, and never exceeded RMB 200 million, such investment nearly doubled between 2009 
and 2010 to more than RMB 340 million, and more than doubled again to RMB 716 million in 
2011.  
 
Similarly, Li Zhanshu’s administration increased the scale and pace of development in 
several of the cornerstones of the micro-oriented state. For instance, Li worked to scale up 
tourist cites and brought in massive amounts of investment (some 283 projects received a total 
of RMB 182 billion in investment). Whereas previous policy focused on dozens of villages to be 
developed as tourist cites, Li shifted the strategy to focus on 10 specific villages. Xi Jinping, 
during a visit to Guizhou in May 2011 endorsed this strategy. Li also turned away from 
previous strategies of focusing on small-scale mines that poor farmers could exploit to focus on 
large-scale mines. Li also deepened Shi’s commitment to building additional highways and 
high-speed railways. The central importance of development continued to be emphasized in the 
annual work reports under both Li Zhanshu and Zhao Kezhi. Between 2010 and 2013, poverty 
was only mentioned once in the work report, and not in the prominent position that it had 
earlier attained. Added to the emphases of industrialization, urbanization, transportation 
infrastructure and agricultural industrialization that became prominent starting in 2007/2008 
were new items such as investment and promotion of specialized industries.  
 
The economic impact of these policies – recent as they have been – are not yet obvious (I do 
not yet have access to comprehensive 2012 statistics). However, a few indicators are quite 
telling. For instance, the rate of investment in fixed assets in Guizhou – as noted above – had 
already started accelerating before Li Zhanshu’s tenure as party secretary. However, under Li’s 
administration, such investment exploded. Whereas Guizhou’s investment rates increased by 
more than 32 percent in both 2009 and 2010, by 2011 the growth rate in investment exploded to 
60 percent – compared to a growth rate of 11 percent in Yunnan. Moreover, for the first time at 
least during the post-Mao administration, Guizhou’s actual levels of investment exceeded that 
of Yunnan’s. While in 2010 growth in GDP per capita (17.6 percent) recovered from a slowing 
rate in 2009 (9.9 percent growth), economic growth exploded to 23.9 percent. This growth was 
reflected in Guizhou’s cities, which grew rapidly.  The industrial structure also shifted rapidly. 
Agriculture made up less than 15 percent of the economy for the first time in 2009. By 2011, it 
declined to 12.7. The contribution of industry and especially services made up for the lost share. 
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Thus, the priorities of the new leadership appear to represent a complete break from the 
three decades-long strategy of focusing primarily on economic activities in which poor farmers 
could participate. While it is too early to judge the economic effects of this, the break can be 
attributed to the background and factional identities of Guizhou since 2008 – just as they had in 
previous years. 
 
Part IV. Conclusions 
 
Based on this analysis, I concluded my previous research by suggesting that the pattern 
found in the two provinces is consistent with the literature on central-provincial relations. 
Yunnan’s strategic location and position within the national economy would lead analysts to 
expect that Yunnan officials would be much more responsive to central priorities, compared to 
Guizhou, which indeed turned out to be the case. Meanwhile neither the far greater funds that 
central officials sent to Yunnan, compared to Guizhou, for poverty-alleviation, nor the rapid 
growth of the economy, had much effect on Yunnan’s rural poverty rate. This factor worked 
quite differently in Guizhou. In contrast to the spirit of central policies that emphasized growth 
and development, provincial leaders there focused much more extensively on poverty 
reduction, even at the expense of economic growth.73 While central authorities were consistent 
in the overt support of, and even demand for, the development of Yunnan’s tourism, highway 
system and especially tobacco, the center seemed to tolerate the fact that Guizhou’s policy was 
less in compliance with central dictates. Nevertheless, because the center relied on development, 
including rapid industrialization and economic growth, as a primary mechanism to reduce 
rural poverty, Guizhou policy deviated markedly from central policy, as well as from the path 
that most other provincial governments, including Yunnan, traversed. This maverick tradition 
continued even as Guizhou’s strategy shifted. For instance, while central poverty alleviation 
policy emphasized participatory poverty reduction, these were not the focus of Secretary Li 
Zhanshu. Participatory poverty reduction is barely mentioned in the 2011 and 2012 yearbooks. 
 
While central-provincial relations appear to fit the case of Guizhou and Yunnan better than 
elite analysis, there is an important element of elite motivation and interest to this story. On the 
surface, comparing the patterns of elites in the two provinces seems to contradict the 
expectations of elite analysis. For the pre-1993 period, Yunnan politics was dominated by two 
long-serving localists who had reached the apex of their careers and thus would have little to 
lose by resisting central policy. Guizhou, on the other hand, was led a by a number of party 
secretaries who were assigned by the center and were later promoted out, leading us to expect 
compliance with central policy. Yet the actual pattern was the opposite: Yunnan’s 
developmentalist strategy was much more in line with central policy than was Guizhou’s 
micro-oriented approach. A closer examination of this factor reveals that this line of analysis 
fails to explain the actual pattern found in the two provinces. I argue that is because this 
approach overlooks two important elements: a) the type of officials that were politically 
influential and b) the characteristics of specific location from which these elites originate. 
                                                
73 In fact, Guizhou’s propensity to deviate from central policy started early, with the province becoming a 
pioneer in the policy to return agriculture to household responsibility. While Anhui province is often 
(and correctly) cited as a pioneer for agricultural reform of the early 1980s, Guizhou-based scholars argue 
that their province was equally if not more so. In any case, according to Lynn White, Guizhou had 
returned a higher proportion of its land to farmers than did Anhui. See Lynn White, Unstately Power  
(Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).  
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Moreover, the specific point of origin – not just which province the leader is from – is also 
crucial. Guizhou’s localists had significant local ties to poor counties in the province, and were 
inclined to reduce endemic poverty there even at the expense of economic growth. Moreover, 
although some of the top Guizhou officials were not local, some, particularly Hu Jintao, appear 
to have been motivated by specific ideas about how the problem of rural poverty should be 
addressed and a nuanced, multi-dimensional view of how to measure economic success that 
transcend simple measures like GDP. By contrast, Yunnan’s top officials, though hailing from 
rural counties, were born and served for years in the some of Yunnan’s wealthiest areas, 
including the tobacco-rich farming areas of Yuxi or in the province’s most attractive areas to 
promote tourism. This type of localist leader was more interested in implementing growth-
oriented policies that promoted industries to benefit their home areas. This pattern continued in 
Guizhou: the various experiences of local leaders motivated them to adopt various strategies, 
and the party secretary formally running the province sometimes did not seem to be completely 
in charge.  
 
Finally, the importance of initial conditions, the third factor, while constant in most respects, 
cannot be completely rejected. Guizhou’s recent history and the small groupings in which the 
province’s minorities lived apparently contributed to some aspects of the province’s success in 
poverty reduction, facilitating provincial leaders’ ability to encourage migration, for instance. 
Nevertheless, compared to other explanations discussed here, the contribution of this factor was 
much less influential in explaining Guizhou’s economic policies of this period. Moreover, this 
culture hypothesis is inconsistent with the data suggesting that minorities from both provinces 
do indeed migrate, and that rural residents from Yunnan’s minority regions migrated in some 
years at higher rates than those from the rest of the province, according to data from statistical 
yearbooks.  
 
Thus each of these major factors – central constraints and opportunities, characteristics of 
provincial officials, and (to a lesser extent) initial conditions – contributes to our understanding 
of the two provinces. These factors are not in conflict. This study suggests that these approaches 
to understanding provincial level policy making can and should be used together. However, 
both initial conditions and central constraints in Guizhou’s case served as factors that permitted 
the chief motivations and drivers of Guizhou’s economic strategy, which were related to 
characteristics of provincial officials, to create the province’s unorthodox strategy.  
 
That strategy was not short-lived. I document that the micro-oriented approach started in 
the late 1980s and lasted at least until around the middle of Shi Zongyuan’s administration 
around 2007. During these three decades, Guizhou’s slow growth was distributed in a way that 
benefitted the poor. This pattern was not an accident, but was based on policy choices designed 
largely to generate opportunities in poor people could participate. However, even under Shi’s 
and certainly during subsequent leadership, the micro-oriented state has apparently been 
largely abandoned in favor of a more GDP-oriented, high-tech, high-scale strategy focused on 
urbanization and development. While political will and the forces of path dependence can 
maintain a strategy for a time, it seems that these factors cannot resist the will of strong 
leadership backed by powerful central forces bent on changing approaches.  
 
In addition, both the previous research and the study of the more recent time emphasize 
that local interests are constructed and shaped, and cannot be taken as a given. Their definition 
is very much contested. Leaders in these two provinces had quite separate interpretations of 
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what local interests were, and how they should be pursued. Some focused on ‘people’s 
livelihoods,’ adopting policies designed to promote GDP. Others focused on rural poverty, 
structuring economic opportunities in ways that poorly educated rural residents, with modest 
endowments of capital and other resources, could take advantage. Oftentimes, these goals and 
policies conformed to central interpretations, which have also been contested and varied. 
Instead of taking ‘local interests’ as an assumption when studying whether local officials 
promote them or not, scholars should be taking an interest in how those interests are shaped.  
 
Finally, there is a question of what might have been. Many scholars have concluded that 
Hu Jintao’s era has represented a lost era. However, it is clear that he has tried to turn China’s 
economic policy away from its singular focus on GDP, to look at other issues such as rural 
poverty, environmental protection and other important issues. From my research on the Hu 
tenure in Guizhou, as well as those of his successors, it is clear that Hu’s commitment is deep 
and abiding. The ideas behind a more scientific view of development were formed during his 
leadership in Guizhou province as elsewhere.  
 
China now faces an ever-increasing gap between rich and poor. Protests, both virtual and 
real, are continuing apace. The rural and urban poor are understandably turning to populist yet 
cynical, opportunistic leaders such as Bo Xilai, with his allegedly murderous femme fatale 
spouse and his second homes along the French Riviera. Fieldwork makes clear that many of 
Hu’s policies – agricultural subsidies, the cancelation of the agricultural tax, education and 
health care provision – have made somewhat of a difference in improving the livelihoods of 
China’s rural population, even if they failed to keep pace with growth in the rest of China. Now 
Guizhou seems to be turning to a different strategy. So too, the central government under 
Premier Li Keqiang’s urbanization strategy seems to be turning away from Hu’s more balanced 
approach.  
 
If Hu had been a stronger leader, would many of the divisive forces that confront China – 
forces that may worsen under Xi and Li – have lessened in intensity? And what of Guizhou’s 
future? These questions are the basis for future research and fieldwork.  
 
